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This paper presents evidence from a field experiment, which aims to identify the two sources 
of workers’ pro-social motivation that have been considered in the literature: action-oriented 
altruism and output-oriented altruism. To this end we employ an experimental design that first 
measures the level of effort exerted by student workers on a data entry task in an environment 
that elicits purely selfish behavior and we compare it to effort exerted in an environment that 
also induces action-oriented altruism. We then compare the latter to effort exerted in an 
environment where both types of altruistic preferences are elicited. We find that action-
oriented altruism accounts for a significant increase in effort, while there is no additional 
impact due to output-oriented altruism. We also find significant gender-related differences in 
the treatment effect: women are very responsive to the treatment condition eliciting action-
oriented altruism, while men’s behavior is not affected by any of the treatments. 
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What motivates workers on their job? For certain type of workers, besides extrinsic rewards, an
important drive is a concern towards the social cause pursued by the organization they work for,
or a sense of altruism towards the welfare of a third party that is the recipient of the good or
service being produced in their workplace. Such workers are willing to make labor donations, by
providing on-the-job e⁄ort beyond what is contractually required of them. There is mounting
empirical evidence that this type of labor donations are important in organizations engaging in the
provision of education, health care, child-care, and social services as well as in charities and NGOs
that advance all sorts of social missions.1
A recent burgeoning theoretical literature in economics recognizes the important role of workers￿
pro-social motivations and examines their implications for the design of incentive contracts, the
selection of workers, the provision of e⁄ort and organizational design, see for instance, Besley and
Ghatak (2005), Delfgaauw and Dur (2007, 2008), Dixit (2002), Francois (2000, 2007), Glazer (2004),
Murdock (2002). Typically, two alternative views of altruism have been considered (a) Action-
oriented altruism: the worker derives direct nonpecuniary bene￿ts from the act of contributing to
a cause she cares about2 and (b) Output-oriented altruism: the worker is concerned about the actual
impact of her actions or the well-being of others.3 The two key implications of these approaches
are that (1) An altruistic worker will provide more e⁄ort, and, (2) An altruistic worker requires less
monetary compensation, see for instance Besley and Ghatak (2005). In addition, papers that have
taken the output-oriented approach, see for instance Francois (2000, 2007), have shown that this
way of modelling pro-social preferences has implications for organizational design, as organizations
without residual claimants may have an advantage in eliciting workers￿altruistically motivated
contributions to the organizations output. On the contrary, this would not be the case with
action-oriented workers. Therefore, this distinction has important policy implications, for instance
regarding the debate over the privatization of public services delivery. The two approaches have
also implications for the motivation of workers in corporations that pursue social ends via corporate
social responsibility (CSR) policies. In particular, the exact nature of workers￿pro-social motivation
1Most notable is the recent evidence in the paper by Gregg et al. (2009) who study the incidence of donated labor
in the U.K., measured by unpaid overtime, and ￿nd that it is more likely to occur in the not-for-pro￿t sector than in
the for-pro￿t sector.
2There may be various psychological underpinnings for this, including the receipt of social recognition that improves
self-respect or pride (Benabou and Tirole 2006, Ellingsen and Johannesson 2008), which has been the focus of some
recent experimental studies (Ariely et al. 2009).
3These two conceptualizations of workers￿altruism are the logical counterparts of ￿ warm glow￿and ￿ pure altruism￿ ,
the two motives that in economics have been associated with charitable giving and the private provision of public
goods, see Andreoni (1989, 1990).
1matters for the design of the CSR policy (e.g. should the fraction of the ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts that is donated
to the social cause be linked to workers￿productivity or not).
While these two approaches have proved to be useful in deriving theoretical insights as to
the implications of workers￿pro-social preferences, no attempt to quantify and discriminate the
importance of the two using non-experimental data has been made, in part because appropriate
￿eld data that would allow for sound econometric analysis are di¢ cult to come by. In this paper
we report ￿ndings from a controlled experiment which is a ￿rst, to our knowledge, attempt to
disentangle and quantify the two sources of intrinsic motivation. An important aspect of our
design is that we observe subjects providing real e⁄ort in a natural work environment, thus heeding
Levitt and List (2007) who argue that pro-social behavior observed in the lab may not translate
into behavior in the ￿eld. A related point is made by Della Vigna (2009) in a recent review of the
literature on economics and psychology, who points out that ￿the research on social preferences
displays more imbalance between laboratory and ￿eld￿compared to research on other topics and
calls for ￿more papers linking the ￿ndings in the laboratory [...] to the evidence in the ￿eld￿(pg
341). Similar type of labor market ￿eld experiments using student workers have been recently used
to evaluate how various behavioral considerations, such as, reciprocity and peer e⁄ects operate in
labor markets (Falk and Ichino, 2006; Gneezy and List, 2006; Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2008).
We hired university students through email announcements to perform a short-term computer
data entry job on two separate occasions (one hour each). Using a short term job has the advantage
of removing career concern aspects or repeated game strategies that may represent a confounding
factor for the interpretation of the results (Bandiera et al., 2005). On the ￿rst occasion we paid
all students £10 plus a performance bonus based on their performance. On the second occasion,
we randomized students into three di⁄erent groups. For the ￿rst group the second occasion was
identical to the ￿rst one. This baseline condition acts as our control, as it accounts for any change
in productivity due to experience, learning and so on. For the two other groups, we implemented
two treatments aimed at eliciting, respectively, action-oriented e⁄ort and e⁄ort that is induced by
both types of altruistic preferences. More speci￿cally, in treatment A, we adapted the methodology
developed by Crumpler and Grossman (2008), which aimed at isolating and measuring warm-glow
giving in a laboratory setting, using a dictator game where the recipient was a charity. In that
paper, subjects were given a monetary endowment and were asked how much of that they would
want to allocate to a charity when the contribution of the subject crowded out the contribution of
the experimenter such that the charity always received a ￿xed amount. They found that subjects
donated on average 20% of their endowment, which provides evidence of the strength of the warm
2glow motivation for charitable giving. In our setting, we are interested in measuring the strength
of the action-oriented motivation for making labor donations, so in this treatment we told subjects
that besides their personal compensation, which remained the same as in the ￿rst occasion, their
e⁄ort could contribute to a charity of their choice, but their contribution would perfectly crowd out
our contribution so that the total amount the charity received was ￿xed at £15. Given the nature of
the donation any additional e⁄ort that the students might provide in this treatment, relative to the
baseline treatment, can be solely attributed to action-oriented intrinsic motivation. In treatment B,
we told subjects that besides their personal compensation, which remained the same as in the ￿rst
occasion, their e⁄ort could contribute to a charity of their choice with no crowding out taking place,
so that the total donation that the charity received depended on their e⁄ort. In this treatment,
both sources of pro-social behavior are elicited. Therefore, any additional e⁄ort that we observe in
this treatment relative to treatment A can be attributed solely to output-oriented altruism.
We found that e⁄ort is positively a⁄ected by an environment that induces action-oriented altru-
ism, while there is no additional impact due to output-oriented altruism. Interestingly, we found
signi￿cant gender-related di⁄erences in the treatment e⁄ect. In particular, our results suggest that
women are very responsive to the treatment condition eliciting action-oriented altruism, increasing
their productivity between the two sessions by an additional 14% compared to women in the control
group, while they do not display any additional increase in e⁄ort due to output-oriented altruism.
On the other hand, for male subjects, we ￿nd no statistically signi￿cant di⁄erences in productiv-
ity changes between the control and any of the treatment groups. This unresponsiveness suggests
that pro-social preferences are less relevant for men than for female workers in our sample. Our
results are consistent with those obtained in studies that have examined experimentally di⁄erences
in social preferences across genders.4
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section presents the experimental design.
Section 3 discusses the conceptual framework we use and derives the behavioral predictions. Section
4 presents the results of the study and section 5 o⁄ers some concluding remarks.
4See Camerer (2003) and Croson and Gneezy (2009) for an overview of the experimental evidence of gender
di⁄erences in social preferences.
32 Experimental Design
2.1 Recruitment and Task
The experiment was conducted with undergraduate students recruited through email announce-
ments at the University of Southampton in the fall term of 2008. The job ad was asking for
students interested in assisting with data entry for a research project in economics. The announce-
ment stated that no prior experience was needed other than basic typing and some familiarity
with Microsoft Excel and that interested students should be able to work for a period of 2 hours
on two separate occasions over a four-week period. The email also indicated that compensation
would include a £10 ￿xed-fee for each session plus a performance bonus. Interested students were
asked to respond indicating their availability, and selection among respondents was based on this
information. In total we recruited 71 students of diverse academic backgrounds - Computer Science,
Biology, Social Sciences and Engineering - excluding Economics. It is worth noting that students
were unaware ex-ante that they were participating in an experiment.
The task consisted of typing data contained in input-output tables that the student received in
a booklet into an Excel Worksheet.5 Each table consisted of 48 randomly generated 3-digit numbers
(2 decimals) that always added up to 100. Each table in the booklet and the worksheet is identi￿ed
by a date (e.g. Jan 1953) and students had to enter each table frame in the corresponding worksheet.
For each table, students were told not to enter the last column and row, as these were automatically
calculated by Excel, but were asked to check that the numerical values calculated by Excel for the
last column and row corresponded to the ones on the booklet and that the value in the bottom right
cell equalled 100. The worksheet also contained a counter which tracked the number of completed
tables, the student￿ s compensation and the donation amount when applicable.6 This particular data
entry task was chosen such that performance is perfectly measurable (number of table entries), and
did not allow for cooperation or teamwork, as each participant worked separately without knowing
what other participants were doing or even how many other participants were involved. This has
the advantage of removing possible confounding factors related to peer pressure. The task was
performed in a standard university o¢ ce on a desktop computer.
We employed 3 research assistants to give instructions and supervise student workers (each
student was supervised by the same assistant on both occasions). The research assistants after
greeting the student and introducing the task left the o¢ ce so that during working time the student
5See the attached Instructions sheet given to subjects for a more detailed description of the task.
6A screen-shot of the worksheet used for data entry is included in the Appendix.
4was not monitored. After one hour, the assistant came back and counted the number of entries.
At the end of the second occasion, payments were arranged and the student was asked to ￿ll out
a short questionnaire. For each session, students received the pre-announced ￿xed wage of £10,
plus a performance bonus of 10p per table entry. Their total compensation was on average £13 per
session.
2.2 Treatments
Each one of the treatments that was part of our design involved the students performing the task in
two separate occasions, 60 minutes on each session. The two sessions were approximately 2 weeks
apart. Employing a within-subject design allows us to control for individual di⁄erences in typing
ability that might be present. We observe no attrition between sessions in our sample as all of the
students who were recruited turned up in both sessions. On the ￿rst occasion, all students were paid
on the basis described above, so that compensation depended on the amount of work performed.
There was no mention in the ￿rst occasion that a charitable donation might be introduced later.
On the second occasion students were randomized into three treatments7. Some underwent the
￿rst treatment, which we call the Baseline treatment and serves as our control. In this condition
students were paid on the exact same basis as in the ￿rst session. The di⁄erence in output between
sessions 1 and 2 produced by those involved in this treatment is going to serve the benchmark
against which we are going to compare performance in the other treatments.
In Treatment A, students were o⁄ered the same personal compensation as in the Baseline Treat-
ment. Moreover, students were told that due to the funding of the project, in addition to their
personal compensation we were going to make a lump-sum donation to a charity of the student￿ s
choice (£15).8 It was explained to them that part of the lump-sum donation will be made on their
behalf based on their performance: for each table the charity received 30p on their behalf, while
the rest would be supplemented by us so that the charity received a total of £15.
Finally, in Treatment B, students were o⁄ered the same piece rate as in the Baseline Treatment
and, in addition, were told that a donation will be made to their preferred charity on their behalf
based on their performance: for each table they typed the charity would receive 30p on their
behalf. To ensure that each subject in Treatments A and B valued the cause to which the donation
7We check whether the distribution of observable characteristics is the same across treatments using a non-
parametric contingency table Pearson chi-square test. The gender composition is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent across
treatments (p-value: 0.639), as is citizenship (p-value: 0.997), year of birth (p-value: 0.665), course of study (p-value:
0.525), year of study (p-value: 0.430).
8The list of charities used in the experiment is included in the Appendix.
5is directed we allowed participants to choose the donation recipient not only among a list of charities
with diverse missions, but also by indicating an alternative charity.9 10 The option of not making
any contribution was also present, in which case the money would remain in the research fund, but
nobody exercised it. Compared to the Baseline, in the two treatments the job is then characterized
by a pro-social dimension, represented by the charitable donation. Notice that in both treatments
it is the student￿ s choice that determines whether a donation is made at all as well as to which
charitable cause the donation is contributing to.
Comparison of e⁄ort obtained across the three treatments allows us to assess the relative
strength of the two alternative sources of pro-social motivation in the workplace. In particular,
comparing the changes in e⁄ort we observe in the two sessions between Treatment A and the Base-
line allows us to detect any e⁄ort due to action-oriented altruism, while the changes in e⁄ort we
observe in the two sessions between Treatment B and Treatment A allows us to detect any e⁄ort
due to output-oriented altruism. In the following section we present a simple framework that makes
these predictions regarding workers￿behavior in the three treatments more precise.
To summarize, our experimental design shuts down alternative channels which might cause
workers to act pro-socially in the workplace, such as the expectation of future labor market rewards
(career concerns) or peer pressure. Also, we believe that reciprocity (gift exchange) toward the
employer related to the personal compensation can be ruled out for several reasons. First, on
average these students were making the standard undergraduate RA hourly wage and therefore it
is unlikely that their compensation would be received as very generous. Second, the use of piece rate
compensation means that any additional e⁄ort is remunerated and thus reduces the possibility that
workers use e⁄ort as a way to reciprocate toward the employer. Finally, as personal compensation
is the same across control and treatment groups what we measure when comparing productivity
across them is e⁄ort induced by either type of altruism, over and above e⁄ort induced by feelings
of reciprocity toward the employer, if any.
2.3 Conceptual Framework
In this section we present a simple speci￿cation of a worker￿ s utility function and derive optimal
e⁄ort in three working environments that correspond to the three treatments that are part of our
design. This framework helps us formulate the main behavioral predictions that we then evaluate
9Four subjects indicated an unlisted charity of choice.
10To ensure the credibility of the donation, subjects were also asked to indicate whether they wanted to receive a
thank you email from the charity. Slightly more than half of the subjects opted to receive a note.
6in our ￿eld study and helps with the interpretation of the results.
Suppose that a worker￿ s preferences are represented by the following quasi-linear utility function:
(1) U(y;e;g) = y ￿ c(e) + ￿ (e) + ￿(g)
where y is income, e is e⁄ort supplied and g is a public good the worker cares about. The cost
of exerting e⁄ort is captured by the convex cost function, c(￿). The utility function in (1) embeds
both a concern for material compensation as well as the two sources of pro-social motivation that
are of interest here. Action-oriented altruism is captured by the concave function, ￿ (￿); which
represents the enjoyment the worker receives when e⁄ort contributes to the production of a good
or service she considers socially worthwhile. Output-oriented altruism is captured by the the last
term in the utility function, the concave function ￿(￿), which implies that the worker is concerned
about the total quantity of a public good, g, that is provided.11 Notice that the worker￿ s e⁄ort may
directly contribute to the amount of public good, that is, g = g (e;"), where " represents a vector
of other inputs in the production of the public good.
Suppose that the worker￿ s income is y = k + ep; where p is a piece rate the worker receives for
each unit of output/e⁄ort, and k represents income from other sources plus possibly a lump-sum
payment related to the job. We examine e⁄ort provision in three di⁄erent settings.
First, the baseline case, where the worker￿ s e⁄ort is unrelated to the production of the public
good so both sources of pro-social behavior are absent. Then equilibrium e⁄ort is given by:
(2) e￿ s:t: c0 (e￿) = p;
namely, where the marginal cost of e⁄ort is equated to the marginal private return of e⁄ort. This
case corresponds to the Baseline Treatment in our experimental design.
Second, the action-oriented case, where worker￿ s e⁄ort takes place in an environment that is
associated with the production of the public good but where e⁄ort does not directly a⁄ect the
quantity of the public good. Then equilibrium e⁄ort is given by:
(3) ^ e s:t: c0 (^ e) = p + ￿0 (^ e);
11In the interest of clarity we present here the separable case. However, what follows does not rely on the separability
of the two e⁄ects. It holds under a more general speci￿cation where the two e⁄ects are not additively separable




@g > 0 and
d2￿
de2 < 0:
7where the marginal return of e⁄ort is increased by the fact that the worker enjoys the act of
contributing to the production of the public good. Note that the properties of c(￿) and ￿(￿) imply
that ^ e ￿ e￿. This case corresponds to Treatment A in our experimental design, as in that context
workers￿e⁄ort contributes to a charitable cause but has no impact on the total amount that gets
transferred. We summarize the ￿rst main behavioral prediction:
Prediction 1 Any di⁄erence in the amount of e⁄ort supplied in Treatment A relative to the Base-
line Treatment, ^ e ￿ e￿, is due to the worker￿ s action-oriented altruism.
Third, the complete case, where worker￿ s e⁄ort takes place in an environment that is associated
with the production of the public good and is directly linked to the amount of the public good
produced, so both kinds of pro-social motivations are potentially induced. Then equilibrium e⁄ort
is given by:
(4) ~ e s:t: c0 (~ e) = p + ￿0 (~ e) + ￿0 [g (~ e;")]
@g (~ e;")
@e
where the marginal return of e⁄ort is augmented by its impact on public good provision. Note that
￿0 (￿) ￿ 0 implies that ~ e ￿ ^ e: This case corresponds to Treatment B in our experimental design, as
in that context workers￿e⁄ort contributes to a charitable cause and it does not lead to crowding
out of the experimenter￿ s contribution.
We can now state the second main behavioral prediction of this framework:
Prediction 2 Any di⁄erence in the amount of e⁄ort supplied in Treatment B relative to Treatment
A, ~ e ￿ ^ e, is due to the worker￿ s output-oriented altruism.
This simple framework provides us with some predictions regarding how we should expect that
a worker will respond to each of these settings that involve a monetary compensation and induce
di⁄erent combinations of altruistic motivations (action and output oriented). In the next section
we present the results of the study.
3 Results
We are going to evaluate both behavioral predictions by assessing the change in productivity be-
tween the two sessions across the di⁄erent treatments. In particular, we look at the percentage
8change in output measured by the total number of completed tables in each session. Table 1 pro-
vides descriptive statistics and Figure 1 displays the kernel density estimates of the distribution of
productivity changes across treatments. The ￿rst thing to notice is that in all treatments it appears
that there is an increase in average productivity between the ￿rst and the second session. Despite
a relatively simple task, it is likely that some learning is taking place: in the second session stu-
dents are more familiar with the environment and the requirements of the job. This underlines the
importance of having a baseline treatment to control for all factors a⁄ecting productivity changes
between the two sessions other than compensation. Moreover, subjects in the treatment groups
appear to raise productivity by more (15%) than those in the baseline (12%). We formally assess
whether this di⁄erence is statistically signi￿cant using a one-tailed Mann-Whitney (M-W) test and
a one-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test (see Table 2).12 The di⁄erence between control and
treatment A and the di⁄erence between control and treatment B is statistically signi￿cant at the
p < 0:1 level, in most of the cases, while the di⁄erence between treatment A and B is insigni￿cant.
The data in Table 1 also suggest that there are signi￿cant gender di⁄erences in the treatment
e⁄ect.13 This is also evident when one inspects the distribution of productivity changes for each
gender separately (Figures 2 and 3). In particular, women appear to be more responsive to the
treatment conditions, as they raise productivity by 21% in treatment A and 19% in treatment B
as compared to 12% for women in the baseline condition and these di⁄erences between treatments
and the baseline are signi￿cant at the p < 0:05 level, while the di⁄erence between treatment A
and B is insigni￿cant. On the other hand, for men each comparison yields insigni￿cant di⁄erences.
Notice that for the control group the average values for the level of productivity and its change
across sessions are identical between men and women. This suggests that the di⁄erential response
between genders is not due to di⁄erent learning across genders, but rather due to the treatments.
We also tested whether the distributions di⁄er signi￿cantly across gender. For the control this is
not the case (M-W two-tailed p-value = 0.967, K-S two-tailed p-value = 1.000). This con￿rms that
there is no gender-speci￿c element in the task in itself. On the other hand, the distribution for the
treatment groups are signi￿cantly di⁄erent across gender (M-W two-tailed p-value = 0.012, K-S
two-tailed p-value = 0.085), con￿rming a di⁄erential response to treatments.14
12The alternative hypothesis for the tests presented in table 2 is that average productivity in the treatment condition
is greater than that in the baseline.
13No di⁄erences have emerged with regards to other dimensions for which there is enough variation in the data,
e.g. previous work experience, occupational expectations (for pro￿t vs non-pro￿t sector), course of study (natural
sciences and engineering vs social sciences and education), donation to charity in the last 12 months, volunteering
activity in the last 12 months.
14In light of the previous result that the two treatments are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent, we pooled treatments A and
B to improve the power of the test.
9To summarize, the distribution of productivity changes displays a signi￿cant shift to the right
for both treatments compared to the control group, while there is no di⁄erence between treatments.
This implies that action-oriented altruism is motivating subjects to work harder, while there is no
evidence of output-oriented altruism. Looking at the data disaggregated by gender, we ￿nd that
the e⁄ect is very strong for women, while it is insigni￿cant for men. We now proceed to quantify
the strength of this motivation, both non-parametrically and through regression analysis. One way
to estimate the shift in the distributions between the two treatments and the control group non-
parametrically is to use the Hodges-Lehmann median di⁄erence. For females, this equals 0.104,
implying a 10.4% additional increase in productivity compared to the control group due to action-
oriented altruism, and is signi￿cant at the 5% level.
Table 2 - Statistical Test Results
All Men Women
Control vs Treatment A
Mann-Whitney test 0:066 0:379 0:028
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 0:044 0:349 0:030
Control vs Treatment B
Mann-Whitney test 0:084 0:418 0:041
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 0:115 0:679 0:040
Treatment A vs Treatment B
Mann-Whitney test 0:482 0:478 0:413
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 0:429 0:380 0:438
One-tailed p-values are reported.
The magnitude of this e⁄ect is in line with the one obtained in a regression setting. Due to
the presence of several outliers (see the box-whiskers graphs, Figure 4), we use a quantile (median)
regression approach. The following equation is estimated
yi = ￿0 + ￿1DAi + ￿2DOi + "i;
where yi is the percentage change in productivity between the ￿rst and the second sessions for
subject i, DO is a dummy equal to 1 if the subject is in treatment B, while DA is a dummy equal
to 1 if the subject has been treated. Thus, ￿2 measures the increase in productivity due to output
oriented altruism, while ￿1 measures the increase in productivity due to action-oriented altruism.
Consistently with the non-parametric tests, for the whole sample the coe¢ cient of the dummy
10variables DO is close to zero and highly insigni￿cant, while the coe¢ cient of DA is signi￿cant both
statistically and economically, indicating an 8% increase in productivity compared to the control
group due to action-oriented altruism. Also, the analysis disaggregated by gender con￿rms the
picture already drawn by the non-parametric tests: in the case of women productivity is increasing
by 14% due to action-oriented altruism, while for men the coe¢ cient of DA is close to zero and
highly insigni￿cant. Very similar results (not reported) are obtained when using M estimation
(iteratively reweighted least squares15).
Table 3 - Median Regression
All Men Women
DA .078** .027 .139**
(.039) (.092) (.060)
DO -.007 -.061 -.034
(.035) (.085) (.056)
Constant .088*** .111 .088**
(.029) (.073) (.043)
N: 71 33 38
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** [**] (*) denote signi￿cance at 1, [5], (10) % level.
4 Concluding Remarks
Experimental methods have enhanced our understanding of how various behavioral notions, such
as fairness, trust, reciprocity, loss-aversion and peer e⁄ects operate in labor markets (Falk and
Gaechter, 2008). Recently there has been an increased interest in understanding the motivating
factors behind workers￿pro-social behavior in workplace settings. This paper contributes to this
literature by performing a ￿rst, to our knowledge, ￿eld experiment which attempts to disentangle
and measure the two alternative sources of workers￿pro-social motivation. Our results underline the
importance of action-oriented intrinsic motivation in the workplace, as it accounts for an increase
in e⁄ort provision that is both statistically and economically signi￿cant. On the other hand, we do
not ￿nd any evidence of output-oriented motivation.
One might think that another motivation that may be responsible for the students￿response
15In particular, we use the STATA implementation, rreg, which uses Huber weights at the beginning of the com-
putation and biweights successively.
11to the treatments is a form of indirect reciprocity towards the employer, driven by the fact that
the employer has acted pro-socially by o⁄ering charitable donations as part of the compensation
package. We believe that if such an e⁄ect is present, it is of second order compared to the direct
e⁄ect of the donation appealing to the worker￿ s altruistic motivation toward the charity itself. To
see this note that a worker who is not altruistic would not derive any additional utility from the
donation made by the employer and therefore would not have any reason to reciprocate toward the
employer. Thus, any such type of indirect reciprocity is conditional on the worker being altruistically
motivated, implying that its e⁄ect on worker￿ s e⁄ort provision is of second order compared to the
direct e⁄ect of the worker￿ s own altruistic motivation, which this study aims to identify. Also, as
explained above with a piece rate compensation scheme in place, working harder is a very blunt
instrument to reciprocate toward the employer.
Another important ￿nding of this paper is that there are considerable gender di⁄erences in
pro-social motivation. In particular, in our sample, pro-social behavior is displayed by women, but
not by men. This ￿nding is consistent with the literature on gender di⁄erences in social preferences.
In particular, Eckel and Grossman (1998) report results from dictator experiments in conditions of
anonymity that indicate that women are more generous than men: women donate on average about
twice what men donate. Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) also study gender di⁄erences in a dictator
game where the price of giving varies and ￿nd more nuanced results: women are more generous
when giving is expensive, and as giving becomes cheaper men are more altruistic. Mellstr￿m
and Johannesson (2008) carry out a ￿eld experiment to examine whether o⁄ering blood donors a
monetary compensation might crowd out their intrinsic motivation for giving and ￿nd this to be
the case for women but not for men.
The ￿nding of a gender di⁄erence in pro-social behavior in a workplace setting may have impor-
tant implications for women￿ s economic outcomes, as if women are more likely to enter occupations
and sectors with characteristics that engender pro-social behavior, e.g. health, education and so-
cial care, and require less monetary compensation then gender di⁄erences in pro-social motivation
would help explain the observed occupational segregation by gender, that accounts for a substantial
portion of the overall gender earnings gap (Gunderson, 1989).
An important related issue is that of accounting for the sorting of workers that takes place in real
labor market settings. The importance of sorting when measuring social preferences experimentally
has been demonstrated by Lazear et al. (2006). Accounting for self-selection will not only lead to
the detection of the treatment e⁄ect for those workers who choose to sort into care-related jobs,
but also the identi￿cation of the characteristics that determine selection into sectors that engender
12pro-social behavior. These issues are the subject of ongoing research.
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